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The  debate  on  the  type-identity  theory  of  the  mind  has  been  profoundly  influenced  by  an 
argument of Saul Kripke's in his well-known essay Naming and Necessity. In that work, a strong 
and, according to many, fatal attack on the type-identity theory of mind and brain was launched in 
the form of the following – quite abridged - argument: if mental states of the same type, say pains, 
are identical to physical states of the same type, say C-fibre firings, then this identity, if true, is 
necessarily true; it is conceivable that two individuals could exemplify the same type of mental state  
while  exemplifying  different  types  of  physical  state;  since  what  is  conceivable  is  possible,1 it 
follows  that  it  is  possible  for  two  mental-type-identical  individuals  to  be  different  as  to  their 
physical states; therefore, mental-state types, or mental properties, cannot be identical to physical-
state types, or physical properties, and the type-identity theory of the mind is false. 2 In this essay I 
shall  argue  that  the  crucial  assumptions  of  Kripke's  argument,  i.e.  the  collapse  of  the 
appearance/reality  distinction  in  the  case  of  phenomenal  states  and  the  idea  of  a  qualitatively 
identical epistemic situation, imply an objective principle of identity for mental-state types. This 
principle, I shall argue, rather than being at odds with physicalism, is actually compatible with both 
the type-identity theory of the mind and Kripke's semantics and metaphysics. Finally, I shall sketch 
a version of the type-identity theory.
Kripke's semantics
According to Kripke (1980), the reference of a term is originally fixed by means of something 
like an act of baptism, and is preserved over time through a sort of causal chain which assures that 
the present usage of the word is firmly linked to the referent of the original baptism. These causal  
considerations entail a deeper metaphysical commitment, according to which the reference of a term 
is secured by some real essence of the referent – some necessary property – without which the 
entity in question would not be the entity it is. However, in baptising and referring we may be in 
1 On this entailment as applied to Kripke's argument on mental properties see Wright (2002). On the vagaries of 
imagination see Hill (1997), and on its role in the whole debate see Hill (2009).
2 In what follows I shall be using states and properties more or less interchangeably. The idea is that a mental state is the 
tokening or the realization of a mental property. The same applies to physical states and properties.
touch not with the real essence of an entity, but instead with some nominal essence of it, that is,  
with some inessential – not necessary, though strongly correlated – superficial property of the entity 
in question. For instance, the real essence of water is H2O, while its nominal essence is the set of 
causal properties connected with it, such as being colourless, tasteless and thirst-quenching. So the 
referent of “water” is H2O, but we can track water down by checking for the presence of its nominal 
essence,  that  is,  its  superficial  –  contingent  –  properties.  However,  when  it  comes  to  bodily 
sensations, the difference between real and nominal essences quite disappears. According to Kripke, 
there is nothing in, for instance, pain which is not in apparently feeling pain. So, in the case of pain 
and other bodily sensations, nominal and real essences coincide, in that all the properties that make 
pain the sensation we know, are necessary to it. 
This argument has had a strong impact on the identity theory of the mind, both of the type and of 
the  token versions.  For  one  thing,  it  has  shown that  there  cannot  be  contingent  statements  of  
theoretical identity, as was held in the Fifties. For another thing, Kripke (1971) has argued that pain 
cannot  be type-identical to any physical state because having pain without  any specific type of 
physical state being invariably tokened is perfectly conceivable – or, conversely, it is possible to 
imagine a subject being in a physical state with which pain is identified and yet not feeling pain. 
What we cannot imagine, though, is a symptomatic counterpart of pain (cf. Wright 2002) which is 
not pain, given the coincidence of nominal and real essences. We shall set out by considering what 
arguments Kripke marshals to support the notion of the independence of mental states from physical  
states and properties.
The phenomenological argument
Most of the discussion on the viability of the identity theory, which states that types of mental 
states are identical to types of physical states, has focused on bodily sensations, such as pain and 
other  states  characterized  by  their  phenomenal  properties.  It  is  generally  argued  that  the  main 
difference  between phenomenal  and physical  properties  is  the  following:  while  the  former  are 
conveyed by what it is like to have them, as Thomas Nagel (1974) famously put it, this is not the  
case  with  the  latter.  Phenomenological  features  are  considered  exhaustively  individuating 
phenomenal properties, or at least many have so argued. David Chalmers is one of them: “[I] use 
the term [qualia] ..., to refer to those properties of mental states that type those states by what it is 
like to have them” (1996: 359, n. 2). Consequently, two phenomenal properties are type-identical if 
and only if they are “what it is like”-identical.
Phenomenal properties, Kripke argues, type some mental states necessarily: “Pain is not picked 
out by one of its accidental properties; rather it is picked out by the property of being pain itself, by 
its immediate phenomenological quality” (1980: 152). So, in Kripke's eyes, when it comes to pain 
and other sensations, what you feel is what you get: pain is simply feeling pain. Therefore, if pain is  
essentially  picked out  by its immediate  phenomenological  quality,  “pain”  directly refers to  this 
quality and not to a cluster of dispositions that carve this property out of our causal life, such as 
being caused by wounds and causing winces and groans. And “pain” refers to this quality in every 
possible world, thus qualifying as a rigid designator. The gist of Kripke's argument has often been 
expressed as the idea that, when it comes to pain and other bodily sensations, appearance (what you 
feel) and reality (what you have) coincide.
To this picture, the identity theorist could reply: if by “reality” we refer to the physical realizer of 
pain,  say C-fibres firing (henceforth C-ff),  while still  maintaining the standard interpretation of 
“appearance” as what is phenomenally present to the mind, then appearance and reality do coincide, 
indeed they are identical to each other –  identity being the strongest form of coincidence. The fact 
is, the identity theorist might continue, that once we have assigned “pain” to this sensation of ours, 
we are ipso facto referring to C-ff, which is identical with this phenomenal sensation. Thus it may 
be true that pain is essentially picked out by its phenomenological properties, but this does not 
exclude  the  possibility  that  these  phenomenological  properties  are  identical  to  some  physical 
properties, like the firing of C-fibres. What the anti-identitist needs is an argument that altogether 
excludes these physical properties from being necessary properties of pain. 
To this end, Kripke argues as follows. If pain were identical to C-ff and “pain” and “C-ff” are 
rigid designators, then their identity would be necessary, because theoretical identities if true are 
necessarily true, even a posteriori. But it seems that we can clearly imagine a case in which a person  
is in pain and still does not have her or his C-fibres firing. Moreover, we can also imagine a case in  
which a person has her or his C-fibres firing and is not in pain, because the activity of these fibres 
should not necessarily be felt as pain.3 
Kripke contrasts the case of pain with that of heat. Imagine identifying heat with a sensation. 
Now, can we imagine that someone is having the same sensation we have when we feel heat and yet 
what the person is perceiving is not heat? We can, Kripke argues, because the feeling of heat is not a  
necessary property of heat. In fact, there can be worlds in which heat exists but there are no sentient 
beings. When we imagine someone who has the same sensation we have when we feel heat, what  
we are imagining is an epistemic situation which is qualitatively identical to the one in which we 
feel  heat.  But  what  the  imaginary  subject  is  feeling  is  not  so  much  heat  as  the  phenomenal 
properties usually associated with heat. When it comes to pain, Kripke argues, the analogy breaks 
down because, while the sensation that we have when we perceive heat is not a necessary property 
of heat, the sensation we have when we are in pain is pain. So, an epistemic situation qualitatively 
identical to one in which we are in pain, is one of pain. In Kripke's own words: “To be in the same  
3 This is a condition that not only those who favour Kripke's view consider central (Hirsch 2010), but one that is taken  
as crucial in evaluating representational theories of phenomenal content as well (Aydede 2009).
epistemic situation that would obtain if  one had a pain  is to have a pain” (Kripke 1980: 152). 
Consequently pain, as it is a sensation, is picked out by its phenomenological qualities, by what it 
feels like to someone to be in pain, while C-ff is picked out by the causal and physical structure of 
the brain. As Christopher Hughes has said, pain has a phenomenological essence while C-ff has a 
physical-structural essence, and these “must be distinguished (twice over)” (Hughes 2004: 202). Is 
this argument watertight?
Objecting to Kripke's argument
Suppose  Smith  is  in  pain  and  his  C-fibres  are  firing.  Kripke  says  that  we can  imagine  an 
epistemic situation qualitatively identical to the one just outlined in which another person, Jones, is 
in pain but his C-fibres are not firing. Perhaps some other fibres are firing, or perhaps nothing is  
firing at all. Let's say that one situation is qualitatively identical to another if and only if “we have 
exactly  the  same evidence,  qualitatively  speaking” (Kripke  1980:  104).  For  instance,  the  Twin 
Earth, as imagined by Putnam (1975), is an epistemic situation qualitatively identical to Earth with 
respect to water, only insofar as we consider the superficial properties of the two liquids. When we 
consider  the chemical  constitution of  the  two substances,  we find them to be different,  so the 
qualitative identity breaks down.
Now, my objection to Kripke's argument is that we can’t really conceive that Smith and Jones are  
experiencing a  type-identical  pain while  differing in  their  physical  states  unless we assume an 
objective principle of mental-type identity. For if it is true that, in the case of pain and other bodily 
sensations, appearance and reality coincide, then the identity conditions for pain and sensations in 
general are determined by the awareness of the subjects who feel them, because there is nothing 
else  that  can determine  the reality  of  these sensations.  If  the  instantiation  of a  mental  state  or 
property is essentially dependent on the subjects' awareness of their own states, then these states are 
intrinsically subjective, that is, they depend on how the subject feels them to be. However, if we 
conceive two subjects as having the same type of mental state, then these states, since they are type-
identical regardless of who is instantiating them, are no longer intrinsically subjective, even if they 
are accessible only through the subjects' awareness. Since we cannot have access to other people's 
pain, and such states are not intrinsically subjective, it follows that in conceiving two subjects as 
having  the  same (type-identical)  sensation,  we are  conceiving a  neutral  or  objective  fact.  This 
hypothetical fact, though, would determine whether two sensations are type-identical only given an 
objective identity principle for sensations. It would be in virtue of this principle that the fact of these  
people's having the same pain obtains. Now, if there is an objective identity principle, it cannot be 
based on the subjects' way of experiencing their own sensations. The only remaining alternative is  
the possibility that the type-identity of a sensation depends on the associated brain state. So, after 
all, for Kripke's argument to hold, it needs either to accept that pain is identical with some physical 
state, whose identity with the phenomenal state grounds the identity of pain across multiple subjects 
while  preserving  the  coincidence  of  appearance  and  reality,  or  to  reject  the  coincidence  of 
appearance and reality in the case of pain and sensations in general.
Kripke, however, launches a second challenge to the identity theory: suppose Smith is feeling 
pain and his C-fibres are firing. Now, can we imagine Smith feeling pain while having D-fibres, 
instead of C-fibres, firing? In other words, can we imagine the same person in an epistemic situation 
which is qualitatively identical from the point of view of his awareness of pain and yet different as  
regards the physical properties instantiated? Basically, Kripke is now presenting his argument in 
intrapersonal terms, whereas the previous example was expressed interpersonally.
I think, however, that it is possible to respond to this new version of the argument by extending 
what I have already said about sensations experienced by different subjects. If there is no difference 
between the appearance of a sensation and the reality, then it is no less problematic to speak of 
sensations of the same type occurring to the same subject in different situations than it is to speak of 
sensations of the same type occurring to different subjects. In both cases, the identity of a sensation 
will depend only on how the subject experiences it to be at the time when it occurs. But how a 
sensation is experienced by a subject at the time when it occurs does not furnish us with a rule that 
determines whether a sensation is of the same type as another one that occurs at a different time. 
Any such rule would have to recognize that sensations have natures that are independent of the way 
they are experienced to be at particular times. But this means that the rule would have to recognize 
that sensations have objective natures, and therefore, natures that are independent of the ways they 
appear to subjects. I shall now proceed to buttress the objection I have outlined.
The identity of phenomenal properties
In my outline of the objection, I stated that if pain states fall within a type then there has to be 
something like an objective principle by which we can determine whether two subjects  -- or the 
same subject at  different times -- are instantiating the same type of phenomenal  property. It  is, 
however,  crucial  to  understand  what  we  mean  by  type-identical  pain  and  what  the  nature  of 
phenomenal experience is.
When we perceive a colour or feel a sensation, we experience properties, like redness or pain. 
These properties are usually characterized by their effects on our subjective awareness, by “what it  
is like” to have them.4 Expressions such as “how it feels” and “what it is like” are very frequently 
4  For a recent critique of the “what it is like” expression see Snowdon (2010). It must be recognized, though, that 
Nagel (1974: 171) originally accepted the idea that “what it is like” states are perfectly objective provided that the 
experiencing subjects  have most of  their biological features in common. Some of the implications of this point will 
surface later.
used to characterize the nature of conscious experience; we could say that a conscious experience is 
one in  which  we experience phenomenal  or  qualitative  properties,  or  qualia for  short.  Charles 
Siewert (2006) express this idea as follows: “there is something it is like for you to see red, to feel 
pain, etc., and the way it seems to you to have one of these experiences is what it is like for you to 
have it”. The fundamental nature of these experiences is characterized by their subjectivity, which 
we  may,  prima  facie,  spell  out  thus:  two  subjects  confronted  with  the  same  stimulus  and 
manifesting  the  same  behavioural  responses  may  nevertheless  have  very  different  phenomenal 
experiences.5 Hence, stimulus/response identity does not entail experiential identity, and there is no 
way to guarantee such identity other than by mentioning the experiential properties and how these 
are experienced.6 The subjectivity of experience is consistent with the idea that, in the case of bodily 
sensations, appearance and reality coincide. That is to say, if Smith has a feeling of pain, i.e., if it  
seems to him that he is in pain, since there is nothing else (as a Kripkean would argue) that Smith 
must instantiate in order for him to be in pain, Smith is in pain.7 Now, even if Kripke himself might 
not be committed to the existence of qualia, his argument has usually been adopted to rebut the 
type-identity theory and thereby uphold the reality of qualia.
In portraying the experiential situation we have isolated two elements:  qualia and experiences. 
Now, there is nothing in a phenomenal property which is independent of how it feels to the subject 
of the experience (to use the verb “to feel” as suggested by Armstrong 1968). At the same time, our 
experiences are what they are by virtue of the qualia of which they are composed. However, since 
in bodily sensations appearance and reality coincide, it follows that there is no difference between a  
quale as it is experienced and the experience of a quale. It is not possible for Smith to revisit his 
experience  of  pain,  to  have  another  experience  of  the  very  same,  occurrent  phenomenal  pain, 
because that would simply be another experience.8 In accepting the appearance and the reality of 
our  bodily  sensations  as  identical,  a  defender  of  Kripke's  argument  is  taking  qualia  and  our 
experiences  of  them  as  identical  as  well,  because  there  is  no  way  to  access  qualia  but  by 
experiencing  them,  so  that  the  idea  of  correcting  one  another,  or  even  ourselves,  about  the 
experiences we are having or the qualia we are experiencing makes no sense. The experience of a 
quale is private and incorrigible.
5 This is basically the zombie case, to which I shall return later.
6 This point has been raised by many authors and from a variety of perspectives. It is the “hard problem” of explaining  
why  C-fibres  feel  that way  (cf.  Chalmers  1996)  or  the  problem  that  determines  an  explanatory  gap  between 
neurobiological explanations of our mental life and its qualitative features (Levine 1983). Perhaps all these problems  
arise from the absence of natural laws that cover phenomenal properties (Davidson 1980).
7 Here, we are assuming that Smith is neither fast asleep, in a coma nor unconscious, i.e., that he is a conscious person 
(cf. Rosenthal 1986).
8 Kripke seems committed to the phenomenal principle (Robinson 1994: 32) according to which: “If there sensibly  
appears to a subject to be something which possesses a particular sensible quality then there is something of which the  
subject is aware which does possess that sensible quality.” Clearly, a subject may revise the judgement of her or his own 
experience, but this is quite another matter. 
Now, in order for two people to have the same type of phenomenal state, the same experience, it  
is necessary for them to experience the same type of feeling, the same phenomenal property. Since 
experiences and the tokening of phenomenal properties cannot be distinguished, the two subjects 
will instantiate one and the same type of mental state. Hence, for two subjects to token the same 
type of phenomenal  property,  they have to have the same type of experience of a phenomenal 
property  of  the  same  type.  But  this  implies  that  there  is  nothing  essentially  subjective  in  our 
experiencing, i.e. that pains and sensations, even if not invariably linked to stimuli and behavioural 
manifestations,  are  not  idiosyncratic  (hence  the  same sensation  can  be  instantiated  in  different 
subjects).  To appreciate  this  point  is  to  appreciate  what  is  crucial  and problematic  in  Kripke's 
argument. We shall now see why in some detail.
If we admit that Smith and Jones can experience the same type of phenomenal property, the same 
quale, and thus have the same experience, we are thereby admitting that a quale is an entity which 
is not subjective in character, and that experiences do not affect the way a  quale is experienced. 
Basically, we are denying that conscious experience such as pain amounts to how it feels to one to 
be in pain, i.e., what it is like for a subject to experience a pain. For if, in one sense, a quale can be 
instantiated in invariable form by many subjects, then its identity is independent of the subjects of 
experience, even though qualia depend on the experiencing subjects in order to be instantiated. (By 
way of  analogy,  consider  colours  as  properties  of  the  surfaces  of  objects:  they  depend  on the 
presence  of  objects  with  surfaces  to  be  instantiated,  even though  they  are  independent  of  the 
individual objects that instantiate them.) At the same time, if Smith and Jones instantiate the same 
type of quale, their experiences cannot affect the quale tokened, since, as I have argued, for Kripke 
there is no difference between the experience of a  quale and the  quale experienced. Hence, they 
token the same type of experience as well, which implies that even experiences are not intrinsically 
subjective. Thus interpreted, qualia and experiences make clear how we can conceive two subjects 
as  instantiating  the  same  type  of  phenomenal  state.  This  result,  however,  has  a  number  of 
consequences.
If phenomenal states can be instantiated in invariable form in two or more subjects, or in the 
same  subject  at  different  times,  then  these  states  are  no  longer  essentially  or  ontologically 
subjective,  for  it  is  conceivable  for  two  or  more  subjects  to  instantiate  the  same  sensation 
(appearance)  in  virtue  of  having  the  same experience.  Having  the  same feeling,  i.e.  the  same 
sensation, though, cannot in turn be a sensation. But if sensations are subjective and each subject is 
isolated  from  every  other  one,  then,  since  these  experiences  are  private,  every  subject  may 
determine  different  type-identities  for  phenomenal  states,  demolishing  the  prospect  for  robust 
identities. So, we need a more secure basis for these identities. At the same time, if we postulate that 
two  subjects  may  instantiate  the  same  type  of  phenomenal  state,  then  these  states  are  not 
ontologically subjective; and if they are not, then they are either ontologically intersubjective or 
objective. To be thus classified, though, there has to be an objective principle by virtue of which we 
can assert that two subjects are in fact instantiating a type-identical mental state. For we cannot  
have recourse to the accessibility of these states, since that is a private matter. So the conceivability 
of their identity depends on some principle, which has to be independent of the subjects' access to 
their  own states.  The  identity  theorist,  then,  is  justified in  arguing that,  since  this  phenomenal 
invariance cannot be supported by principles of identity based on the subjective aspect of conscious 
experience,  it  should  instead  be  based  on  intersubjective  or  objective  principles.  Since  in  this 
metaphysical framework all that we have, apart  from the mental realm, is the physical one, the 
principles that determine phenomenal invariance must be based on the invariance of the physical 
realizers. It follows that the only way to guarantee the stability of the referent of the term “pain” is  
by assuming that in baptising this type of state we were  ipso facto also referring to the type of 
physical  state  by  virtue  of  which  the  phenomenal  state  remains  unchanged  in  its  various 
instantiations.
A possible retort by Kripke could be the following: what is needed to conceive two subjects 
instantiating  a  type-identical  phenomenal  state  is  just  these  two  subjects  having  the  same 
experience. The principle I mention could be needed, at most, if we want to verify whether such a 
situation obtains, and not if we just want to conceive it.
Imagine that we deny that this principle is required to conceive two subjects being in the same 
phenomenal state. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that Smith and Jones are both in pain and can, 
at the same time, access each other's pain. Now, as it happens, Smith feels that he and Jones have 
the same type of mental state, and so does Jones. In virtue of the appearance/reality coincidence, 
they are in the same phenomenal state.
But now consider this other case: Smith feels that he and Jones have the same type of pain while  
Jones feels that they have different types of pain, i.e., he feels the two states as different. Are they in 
the same type of mental state or not? Given that there is nothing to the reality of pain other than the 
way it is felt, then Smith and Jones literally have and do not have the same type of pain. This is a  
conclusion which no one could accept. Here the problem is: since we can conceive Smith and Jones 
diverging (i.e. feeling differently) about their qualitative states, it follows that if we renounce an 
objective principle of phenomenal state identity we run into a contradiction. Moreover, it won’t do 
to reply that their divergence relates to judgements, because I have stipulated that they diverge in 
their feelings and this divergence is all there is that can determine a difference between mental state  
types. By way of analogy: imagine that Smith and Jones are both shown a piece of red card and then 
swap their visual experiences. Due to individual differences in threshold sensitivity to shades of 
colour, one may perceive a difference in shade between the first and the second experiences while 
the other does not.  If it  is assumed that appearance and reality coincide, then they are literally  
having and not having the same experience.
The  fact  is  that  conceiving  two  subjects  as  being  in  the  same  type  of  phenomenal  state 
independently of the subjects' feelings commits us to an objective principle of identity. On the other 
hand,  if  we conceive  this  identity  as  grounded in  the  subjects'  feelings,  then  the  contradiction 
described above follows logically. Hence, we need an objective principle. The conclusion of my 
reasoning,  then,  is  that  Kripke's  anti-identity  argument  presupposes  that  phenomenal  states  are 
epistemically private  but ontologically objective. And such ontological objectivity is compatible 
with  the  type-identity  theory  of  the  mind.  This  previous  reasoning  can  be  applied  to  the 
intrasubjective case as well. In this case, if we admit that one type of phenomenal property can be 
tokened at different times in the same subject, its type-identity should depend on some principle. 
The very same sensation, though, cannot be at once both the tokening and the principle, for it would 
be a private principle, whose proper application nobody but the subject could attest. Now, one can 
deny that privacy constitutes a problem, but the question ought to be addressed, and Kripke does not 
address it in this context. Since privacy, in my view, is an insurmountable problem, we should look 
instead for an objective principle.
Kripke's last challenge to the identity theorist is as follows: my C-fibres could have been firing 
without my having been in pain (a foreshadowing of the zombie case made famous by Chalmers).
If Kripke's argument is to be effective, we must know in what sense I could have been a zombie. 
Assuming that I could be a zombie entails assuming that I could be regarded as a non-sentient 
being. Now, I am not sure that Kripke must perforce assume that being a psychological subject is 
part of the essence of being human. Moreover, such an assumption does not entail assuming that 
this essence must necessarily be manifested (as it is  not when one is in a coma). Nevertheless, it 
seems to me a clearly plausible assumption. I leave this question open. 
The crucial question, though, is: on what basis can we say that the presumptive zombie is not in 
pain or, more specifically, that that particular body does not have pain? In order to conceive of the 
zombie,  we  must  assume  that  the  presence  and  the  quality  of  others'  experiences  of  pain  are 
conceivable independently of the way in which subjects experience their own pain. But assuming 
that  we  can  conceive  the  presence  or  absence  of  some  pain  experience  independently  of  the 
subjects’ own experience  entails  assuming  the  existence,  as  we  have  already  remarked,  of  an 
objective principle of identity, which we can state only in physical terms. Since it is precisely my 
physical properties that remain constant, it seems that not even this zombie argument holds good.
Now, I think that a Kripkean might attempt to rebut the general objection we have raised by 
observing that it does not properly consider the nature of the stipulation Kripke makes in support of 
his case. Let us consider the problem.
Stipulation and God
Kripke stresses that possible worlds are not like distant planets but are like stipulated situations. 
Are there constraints on what can be stipulated? Some thinkers have noted that if stipulating is  
tantamount to imagining a world in which certain things are the case, it is equivalent to imagining 
that if that condition were true of the actual world we would be able to determine the truth of it (cf. 
Fiocco 2007; Yablo 1993). Is this the case when we consider pain and bodily sensations?
Let us consider Kripke's assumption again: Smith and Jones token the same type of pain state, 
while  tokening different  types  of  physical  state.  If  stipulation requires  our  ability  to  determine 
whether a situation holds, we can clearly determine whether their physical states are different in 
type but we cannot determine whether their mental states are the same in type unless we accept the 
stipulation that the identity conditions of a phenomenal-state type are intersubjective or objective. 
Please note that I am not making a verificationist point, i.e., I am not saying that there must be a 
reliable way to keep track of the type identity of these mental states. The point is that the idea of 
assuming the possibility, in principle, of the multiple tokening of mental-state types conflicts with 
the way in which these kinds of states are often construed, on the basis of Kripke's argument, i.e., as 
irreducibly subjective.
A defender of Kripke's view could at this point resort to the God metaphor. Kripke himself, after 
all, resorts to this metaphor when he states that once God has created C-fibres, S/He must also let  
people  feel the stimulation of C-fibres as pain. It seems plausible to suppose that an omniscient  
being could know whether two subjects are in the same type of pain state,  or what type of pain state  
a particular subject is in.
We can  tackle  this  issue  by  considering  two  aspects  of  it,  one  metaphysical  and  the  other 
epistemological.  Metaphysically  speaking,  if  an  omniscient  being  can  determine  whether  two 
subjects  are  in  the  same  type  of  mental  state,  then  these  states  are  no  longer  epistemically 
subjective, i.e. private, since God can know them. If we wanted to hold on to the assumption of 
epistemic subjectivity while still recognizing God's ability to know these states, we would be left 
with the problem of whether we and God are referring to the same type of state, it being in one case  
epistemically subjective and in the other case not.
The epistemological aspect of the issue is as follows: imagine that God accesses our subjective 
experiences  directly,  i.e.,  that  S/He  has  access  to  our  phenomenal  experiences  just  as  we 
subjectively experience them. From this privileged access S/He can evaluate whether two subjects 
are tokening the same type of mental state. But the ability to access this fact,  i.e., that two subjects 
are having the same type of experience, shows that such experiences can be intersubjective. What is 
crucial about the idea of experiences being intersubjective, is that in the case of pain and other 
bodily sensations, the ontology of pain does not depend on what it feels like to  someone, but on 
what it feels like to have that type of experience. Since the ontology of the experience depends on 
what it feels like, it necessarily presupposes subjects of experience; since it does not depend on 
what it feels like to someone in particular, individuals are irrelevant. Consequently, pain and other 
bodily sensations can be thought of as  experiential objects, ontologically independent of specific 
individuals,  but  necessarily  experienced.  We  had  already  reached  this  conclusion  when  we 
discussed the first objection. As we then noted, this conclusion is far from incompatible with the 
type-identity theory: on the contrary its compatibility is evident. Since they are independent of the 
subjects  of  experience,  these  experiential  objects  would  be  the  referents  of  rigid  designators 
applying to bodily sensations, such as “pain” (cf. Hill 2005). However, since there is no way of 
conceiving this intersubjectivity from the point of view of the experiencing subjects, we would do 
better to turn to physical properties in order to secure the intersubjective nature of these objects. 
And C-fibres are the best candidate available. Hence even the God hypothesis, far from supporting 
Kripke, lends support to the identity theory.
Steps toward type identity.
So far I have made no positive proposal about type identity; at the same time, I have promised to 
show that this theory is compatible with Kripke's semantics and metaphysics and that his arguments 
to the contrary are unsuccessful. It is time to fulfil this promise. So let us consider the identity of  
heat with molecular motion.
In asserting this a posteriori identity, it is inessential to specify what molecules are at stake. It is 
in the nature of heat to be the motion of some molecules or other, independently of what type of  
molecules are in motion. In a way, “heat = molecular motion” is a schema of identification, rather 
than an identity statement; and, furthermore, restrictions should be placed on its validity.9 Its not 
being, strictly speaking, an identity statement can be evidenced by pointing out that “molecule” is 
neither a proper name nor a natural kind term. Instead, it refers, one might say, to a general kind. If  
we want to assert an identity statement we should assert something like “heat in water = motion of 
H2O molecules”. In this case, since on either side of the identity sign there are two coreferential 
rigid designators, the identity is secured. Obviously,  heat as such is independent of the kind of 
molecule in which it is realized, as long as there are such molecules. In general, no one would deny 
the identity of heat with molecular motion just because heat can be realized in different types of  
molecules. In other words, no one would argue as follows: 
9  On the restrictions see Wilson (1985); on multiple realizability of such an identity see Bickle (2008) and Kim 
(1972; 1992). See also Gillett (2007) and Polger and Shapiro (2008). In Gozzano (2009) I advance the present line 
of thought.
i) heat = molecular motion;
ii) this occurrence of heat = O2 motion; 
iii) that occurrence of heat = H2O motion; 
iv) O2 ≠ H2O; 
therefore 
v) heat ≠ molecular motion.
Now, the same kind of reasoning can be applied to pain without thereby denying its phenomenal 
character.  Each  type  of  phenomenally  specific  pain  can  be  identified  with  a  different  type  of 
physical state, provided that each time the same type of phenomenal pain is instantiated, the same 
type of physical state is instantiated as well. What type of physical state is tokened depends on how 
fine we wish to make our distinctions between phenomenal types. As a consequence, if we ascribe 
mental states to non-human animals, or to aliens with brains made of jelly, and they have type-
different physical states from ours, we must assume that they have type-different phenomenal states 
as well.  If,  on the other hand, we recognize similar physical states and structures, then we can  
assume  that  these  subjects  have  similar  phenomenal  states.  Hence  the  schematic  identity  that 
parallels “heat = molecular motion” is “pain = pain-fibre firing” which makes it impossible for pain 
to exist in disembodied subjects, but leaves open how we should make the schema more specific 
about the various instances, which is a matter for empirical research (cf. Marras 2005). So “human 
pain = C-ff” and, say, “dolphin pain = D-ff”. If it happens that “X pain = C-ff” for an X which is not 
human, then that subject  or species would have a kind of pain whose qualitative properties are 
identical with ours.
I  believe  that  in  the  foregoing  I  have  shown not  only  that  the  type-identity  theory  is  fully 
compatible with Kripke's semantics and metaphysics, but also that the theory is, pace Kripke, both 
plausible and as substantive as its original proponents intended it to be.
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